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Commentary on Daniel Holender (1986) Semantic activation without conscious identification in dichotic listening,
parafoveal vision, and visual masking: A survey and appraisal. BBS 9:1-66.
Abstract of the original article: When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a
sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of time that allows for further processing. This semantic
activation is generally accompanied by conscious identification, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform
discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus. The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation
without concomitant conscious identification was the central thesis of the controversial research in subliminal perception.
Recently, new claims for the existence of such phenomena have arisen from studies in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and
visual pattern masking. Because of the fundamental role played by these types of experiments in cognitive psychology, the new
assertions have raised widespread interest.
The purpose of this paper is to show that this enthusiasm may be premature. Analysis of the three new lines of evidence for
semantic activation without conscious identification leads to the following conclusions. (1) Dichotic listening cannot provide the
conditions needed to demonstrate the phenomenon. These conditions are better fulfilled in parafoveal vision and are realized
ideally in pattern masking. (2) Evidence for the phenomenon is very scanty for parafoveal vision, but several tentative
demonstrations have been reported for pattern masking. It can be shown, however, that none of these studies has included the
requisite controls to ensure that semantic activation was not accompanied by conscious identification of the stimulus at the time of
presentation. (3) On the basis of current evidence it is most likely that these stimuli were indeed consciously identified.
High-level factors alter signal detectability
J. R. Doyle
School of Management, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United
Kingdom
This commentary concentrates on Holender's (1986) analysis of
backward pattern masking experiments involving the post-cued
judgements task. He claims that these experiments provide no
evidence of semantic activation at short SOAs (stimulus onset
asynchronies); this conclusion is challenged here.
We can distinguish four hypotheses concerning the rela-
tionship between high-level (semantic) activation and low-level
(detection/graphic) activation in their capacity to support appro-
priate responses (abbreviated here as H and L, respectively).
They are:
(1) H > L [2]
(2) H = L [1]
(3) H < L, but H > 0 [1]
(4) H = 0 and L > 0 [0]
where "0" indicates chance responding (the figures in square
brackets are explained below). A fifth possibility, the null
experiment, is that
(5) H = 0 and L = 0 [1].
Marcel (1983) claimed (1) and Holender claimed (4). Both seem
to have assumed that if (1) is not true, then (4) must apply;
hypotheses (2) and (3) were never tested. Doyle and Leach
(forthcoming) reanalysed the experiments that Holender
thought showed no evidence of semantic activation (Fowler et
al. 1981, experiments 1, 2, and 3; Marcel 1983, experiments 1
and 2; Nolan & Caramazza 1982). The number of experiments
favouring each hypothesis is given in square brackets beside
each hypothesis, above. Taken as a whole, these experiments
suggest that there is evidence of high-level activation at short
SOAs which is at least as useful in making responses as low-level
activation.
The hypothesis that low-level judgements were assisted by
high-level activation is consistent with this pattern of results.
The reversal of the assumed flow of causality implied by this
hypothesis was tested directly by using a two-alternative forced-
choice detection task. Words were found to be more detectable
than orthographically regular nonwords. Thus, levels of signal
detectability can be affected by high-level activation. In order to
remove low-level discrimination it may first be necessary to
remove high-level activation. Cheesman and Merikle (1984)
have inadvertently demonstrated this very point by showing
that the conditions which yield zero priming are those which
yield zero discrimination.
Other experiments (Doyle 1985) reinforce the contribution of
high-level activation in signal detection. When stimuli were
balanced on simple sensory qualities such as pixel count or the
number of pixels in the target not overlapped by the mask, a
letter frequency effect was found. When stimuli were balanced
on sensory qualities and on letter frequency, an orthographic
regularity effect was found. Word superiority and word category
effects which could not be reduced to lower levels of activation
were also found. Thus stimuli which are hard to detect leave
demonstrable differences at a number of increasingly abstract
levels of representation.
Interestingly, not all effects appeared in a straightforward
manner; some (e.g., the orthographic effect) had to be teased
out using a special sort of mask which produced apparent
movement in a left-right direction (assumed to affect scanning
of the target). Further evidence of the extent to which stimuli
have undergone processing is the finding that which hand was
used to respond (button-press) not only had an overall effect on
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signal detectability, but also interacted with some of the vari-
ables previously found important.
Signal detection is apparently one of the lowest-level tasks for
which a voluntary response is possible, yet it is affected by high-
level factors. Furthermore, the picture that emerges is not
simple; an exceedingly complex set of operations is hidden
within this simplest of tasks. For this reason alone forced-choice
discrimination is not, as Holender and others have assumed, a
suitable proxy for subjects' awareness, though it promises to be a
useful tool in its own right to investigate the processing of
stimuli at short SOAs.
Editorial note
Professor Holender has read this commentary and has declined to
respond.
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Commentary on Nicholas P. Spanos (1986) Hypnotic behavior: A social-psychological interpretation of amnesia,
analgesia, and "trance logic." BBS 9:449-502.
Abstract of the original article: This paper examines research on three hypnotic phenomena: suggested amnesia, suggested
analgesia, and "trance logic. " For each case a social-psychological interpretation of hypnotic behavior as a voluntary response
strategy is compared with the traditional special-process view that "good" hypnotic subjects have lost conscious control over
suggestion-induced behavior. I conclude that it is inaccurate to describe hypnotically amnesic subjects as unable to recall the
material they have been instructed to forget. Although amnesics present themselves as unable to remember, they in fact retain
control over retrieval processes and accommodate their recall (or lack of it) to the social demands of the test situation. Hypnotic
suggestions of analgesia do not produce a dissociaion of pain from phenomenal awareness. Nonhypnotic suggestions of analgesia
and distractor tasks that deflect attention from the noxious stimuli are as effective as hypnotic suggestions in producing reductions
in reported pain. Moreover, when appropriately motivated, subjects low in hypnotic suggestibility report pain reductions as large
as those reported by highly suggestible hypnotically analgesic subjects. Finally, the data fail to support the view that a tolerance for
logical incongruity (i.e., trance logic) uniquely characterizes hypnotic responding. So-called trance-logic-governed responding
appears to reflect the attempts of "good " subjects to meet implicit demands to report accurately what they experience.
Toward a new paradigm of hypnosis: A
model combining the social-psychological
and special-processes paradigms
Didier M. J. Michaux
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 15 Quai Anatole France,
75700 Paris, France
In a previous issue of this journal, Spanos (1986a) surveyed
contemporary experiments on three hypnotic phenomena: sug-
gested amnesia, suggested analgesia, and "trance logic." Al-
though the experiments he reported are of major interest and
constitute an important contribution to the study of the condi-
tions and mechanisms of suggestibility, we do not agree with his
general interpretations of the data. Our present comments and
criticisms will focus on two main points: (1) misconceptions
about the relationship between hypnosis and suggestibility, and
(2) misconceptions about what is known as the "state theory."
1. Misconceptions about the relationship between hypnosis
and suggestibility. In order to be considered a state, hypnosis
must be characterized by an increase in suggestibility. How-
ever, in our view, this requirement is in no way necessary: The
word "hypnosis" simply refers to a change in consciousness;
besides, most advocates of the state theory have stressed that
the relationship between hypnosis and suggestibility is weak
(Hilgard 1965, p. 392). In 1889, Janet showed that in what was
for him the deepest form of hypnosis, namely, somnambulism,
suggestibility could totally disappear. Fifty years later, White
(1937), who analyzed the differences between active and passive
hypnosis, argued against classifying subjects on the basis of
suggestibility criteria alone. More recently, in a study focused
on behavioral and subjective changes during hypnosis, we have
ourselves found four classes of hypnotic behavior, two of them
positively related to suggestibility (one strongly and the other
moderately) and two negatively related to suggestibility
(Michaux 1982).
Spanos, like other investigators, uses waking suggestions as a
control, as though the administration of suggestions could be
considered a neutral procedure. The main arguments for this
position are based on subjective reports. However, why should
we trust the subject's report that he was not hypnotized when
the opposite report is disregarded? It seems that a skeptical view
should be adopted in both cases.
Subjective testimony has structural limits and one cannot be
sure that any kind of change in mental functioning is automati-
cally identified as such by the subject. In fact - and this applies
not only to hypnotic mental changes - the subject does not
generally seem aware of its occurrence. To be aware of a change
in mental functioning, the subject must focus attention on its
detection or must deduce it from his unusual perceptions and
behavior. In most cases these changes are only inferred by
observers or deduced afterwards by the subject himself; either
he is unable to remember his feelings and behaviors precisely
(amnesia), or he feels unable to integrate his behavior during
this situation into his usual behavior. To be effective, this last
mechanism implies accurate retrieval by the memory of types of
behavior incongruous with normal waking behavior. As a conse-
quence of this incongruity, the subject's consciousness often
does not allow such retrieval and incongruous behavior is
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rejected either by memory alterations (e.g., denial and distor-
tion) or, as already suggested, by amnesia (i.e., repression).
Unawareness of mental changes is illustrated in Milgram's
experiment (1974a) relating to authority. In this experiment, the
behavioral changes are so manifest that the author finds it
necessary to introduce a new concept, that of the "agentic
state," even though the subjects involved in the experiment did
not themselves allude to such a special "state." Perhaps there
are so many social situations in which this kind of mental change
may occur (such as panic states, love, group reactions, and so
forth) that the subject cannot identify state changes as such.
As for the rejection from the subject's consciousness, a pro-
cess very closely related to the thought mechanisms described
by Freudian analysts, this is well illustrated by the behavior of
some subjects who, although watching their video-taped behav-
ior, still cannot remember precisely the content of their hypnot-
ic behavior.
To speculate about the possibility of mental change occurring
during "waking" control is not just a rhetorical exercise. Hyp-
notic induction procedures vary from motor to verbal tech-
niques, and from long to very short verbal inductions (Barber &
Calverley 1965). In the waking condition, the subject is given
suggestions whose content and form - including loss of control,
automatism, and delusion - have been historically linked to
hypnosis. The suggestions in themselves might therefore be
perceived as a specific kind of induction whose manifestations
(i.e., activity, suggestibility, apparent awareness, and so forth)
would be largely a consequence of what Orne (1959a) defined as
"demand characteristics." One may even wonder to what ex-
tent, in an appropriate context, "waking" suggestions are not
the more appropriate way to elicit hypersuggestibility. In this
context, the feelings of automatism and nonvolition which gen-
erally differentiate hypnotic from waking suggestibility would
not represent major differences between the mechanisms pro-
ducing suggestion, but would rather discriminate between the
different mental contexts in which suggestion occurs. During
hypnosis, general alterations in mental functioning produce
feelings of automatism and nonvolition; during the waking state,
suggestion behaviors are decoded in terms characterizing the
usual waking interpretation of behavior, i.e., voluntary control,
volition, and so forth.
2. Misconceptions about the state theory. Coe (1983) com-
plains about the "reification" of the role-playing metaphor by
proponents of the state theory. However, it seems that there is a
similar "reification" of the state paradigm by opponents of the
theory, particularly Spanos. To believe, like the "state theo-
rists," in the occurrence of special mental processes during
hypnosis does not automatically mean to believe that these
processes are exclusive to the hypnotic setting.
The problem lies in defining the concept of the waking state.
There is a tendency to identify waking mental functioning with a
single type of mental activity. However, many alterations in
mental processes can be observed during the waking state,
including alterations in reality testing, time perception, atten-
tion, and so forth. It is difficult to reduce these functions to a
common denominator; they can only be roughly subdivided into
sleeping and waking behaviors. If Spanos and other opponents
of the state theory had such a truly broad concept of the waking
state, the controversy would no longer persist, but that is not the
case. Thus, when nonstate theorists attempt to demonstrate the
normality of mental processes during hypnosis, they do so with
an implicit unidimensional concept of the waking state. This
concept includes being fully conscious, having goal-directed
behavior, and being actively involved in roles. From this point
of view, to reduce hypnosis to the waking state implies that will,
consciousness, and motivation are the ultimate determinants of
hypnotic behavior. It also implies that the subject cannot be
opaque to himself and that everything is willed, with the subject
attempting to fulfill the hypnotist's demands and endeavoring to
perform well. In such a context the subject's claims to act
involuntarily or unconsciously must all be interpreted as at-
tempts to perform the hypnotic role to the best of his ability.
Subjective experience is consequently a delusion, and whether
it is called "role playing" or "role enactment," it refers to an
interpretation in terms of lying and simulation.
The implicit philosophical opposition between the subject's
free will and submission to influence therefore constitutes one of
the major underlying causes of the persistent conflict between
opponents and supporters of the state theory. This opposition,
which can be found in most disciplines, is particularly obvious in
hypnosis and social psychology, both of which deal with influ-
ence. One side, which we could call group-centered, claims that
the influence is real and the subject is passive. The other side,
which adopts a voluntarist, subject-centered position, stresses
the importance of subject intervention in influence mecha-
nisms. The Freudian concept of identification (1921/1981) and
Sarbin and Aliens concept of role enactment (1968) both illus-
trate this second position.
Insofar as they concern the problems of individual freedom
and responsibility, these two antagonistic positions have major
moral implications; hence, perhaps, the persistent conflict
about the reality of hypnosis. In this regard we recall that the
condemnation of animal magnetism by the Royal Commis-
sioners in France was mainly based on moral arguments; they
thought Animal Magnetism was socially dangerous because it
was contrary to contemporary standards of good behavior.
To come back to Spanos's proposition: One cannot help being
surprised by the reference he makes to social psychology,
because the role-playing theory, with its subject's centered
position, is not the whole of social psychology. Studies of
conformity, influenceability, and submission to authority rest
on quite a different basis and clearly show the limits of the
subject's self-control and sovereignty.
Another source of the conflict between free will and submis-
sion to influence lies in the fact that, historically, the alternatives
to prevalent conceptions about hypnosis were always formu-
lated in a negative way: For example, the Royal Commissioners
concluded that Animal Magnetism was nothing but imagination,
Bernheim (1916/1975) asserted that hypnotism was no more
than suggestion, and Spanos (1986a) states that "hypnotic phe-
nomena are similar to other forms of social behavior and explica-
ble without recourse to special processes" (p. 449). As regards
this last assertion we would like to point out that the negation of
special processes, which constitutes an implicit negation of
hypnosis, is based on the unsubstantiated assertion that social
behavior can be satisfactorily explained without reference to
possible changes in mental functioning and therefore without
considering the existence of special processes. Such an affirma-
tion tends to restrict researchers to demonstrating the reality of
hypnosis by showing that during this state there are some
behavioral or mental changes that cannot be observed under any
other conditions. However, we rather believe that hypnosis is
just the artificial reproduction of naturally occurring mental
changes and that it is therefore all the more likely that the same
changes will occur in certain other situations. The proximity of
hypnosis to other phenomena such as imagination, suggestion,
or role-playing does not necessarily mean that hypnosis is
merely produced by these mental mechanisms. Hypnosis can
also have specific characteristics, particularly mental ones, that
explain the manifestations observed in these fields. Instead of
allowing fruitful reflection, the kind of negative alternative
proposed by Spanos generates misunderstanding and mislead-
ing conflicts because it conceals the basis on which it rests.
In conclusion, we believe that there is no real contradiction
between the cognitive social-psychological view and the "spe-
cial processes" position. Although hypnosis must be explained
from a cognitive psychological standpoint, it remains true that
there is as yet no reason other than faith for claiming a priori that
hypnosis cannot involve any special mental processes.
The presence in animals and in all human societies of "hyp-
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noticlike" behaviors, the need for drugs, the radical change
associated with the behaviors somewhat arbitrarily classified by
Sarbin and Allen (1968) as deep involvement roles, seem to
argue more strongly for a "cognitive-social-special-processes
paradigm" than for a restricted "cognitive social-psychological
paradigm," with all its limitations and misunderstandings.
Author's Response
Misconceptions about influenceability
research and about sociocognitive
approaches to hypnosis
Nicholas P. Spanos
Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1S SB6
Michaux's commentary contains a number of misconcep-
tions concerning the views expressed in my target article
(Spanos 1986a). I will accordingly begin by summarizing
my views about the theoretical controversies in the hyp-
nosis research area.
Special process and sociocognitive views. Responsive
hypnotic subjects (i.e., high suggestibles or hypnotiza-
bles) behave in seemingly unusual ways. In response to
hypnotic induction procedures they close their eyes and
appear to fall asleep. When later given test suggestions
they appear to respond in a robotlike manner, as if they no
longer controlled their own behavior. For instance, fol-
lowing suggestions for arm rigidity they appear to strug-
gle unsuccessfully to bend their arm, following sug-
gestions for amnesia they respond as if they were unable
to remember the material covered by the suggestion, and
so on.
Usually, "hypnotic state" or "special process" theories
begin, either tacitly or explicitly, by accepting hypnotic
behavior at face value. For example, on the basis of the
apparent struggles of subjects to bend their arms or to
recall "forgotten" memories, special-process theorists
have often inferred that these subjects have indeed lost
volitional control over motor movement and memory
(e.g., Hilgard 1977a). Having accepted hypnotic behavior
at face value, special-process theorists have gone on to
posit unusual mental processes that they believe are
required to account for the seemingly unusual behaviors
(e.g., "trance logic" dissociation).
The social-psychological (or sociocognitive) account
does not begin by taking hypnotic behavior at face value
(Barber 1969; Sarbin & Coe 1972; Spanos 1986; Wagstaff
1981). On the contrary, the target article (Spanos 1986a)
indicated how a great deal of empirical work conducted
within the sociocognitive tradition has repeatedly dem-
onstrated that hypnotic responses are not as they appear.
Despite appearances, hypnotic subjects remain awake,
actively process environmental inputs, and do not lose
control over their motor systems or their memories. In a
related way, hypnotically age-regressed subjects do not
behave like real children but like adults who are attempt-
ing to behave like children (Nash 1987), and hypnotically
deaf subjects do not respond to delayed authority feed-
back in the same way that organically deaf people do, but
instead like people with unimpaired hearing who are
acting as if they were deaf (Barber 1969).
Such examples can easily be multiplied. Taken to-
gether they indicate the following: (a) Hypnotic behavior
is usefully conceptualized as the goal-directed activity of
aware agents who remain attuned to their social context
and who are motivated to present themselves in a way
that is consistent with the social demands of the hypnotic
test situation, (b) The important antecedents to hypnotic
behavior are frequently similar to the antecedents that
account for behavior in other social influence situations
(e.g., the wording and source of communications, sub-
jects' preconceptions, attitudes, and motivations, the way
that ambiguous communications are interpreted), (c)
Claims that there are processes or states such as "dissocia-
tion" and "trance," implying that subjects have been
transformed from agents who control their own responses
to recipients who passively observe their own automati-
cally occurring responses, are misleading and coun-
terproductive. I can find nothing in Michaux's commen-
tary that offers a serious challenge to any of these conten-
tions. Instead, Michaux has presented a number of mis-
conceptions about sociocognitive views of hypnosis.
The hypnotic state construct. According to Michaux, I
have the following misconception: "In order to be consid-
ered a state, hypnosis must be characterized by an in-
crease in suggestibility." I made no such statement in the
target article or elsewhere. On the contrary, what I and
other sociocognitive theorists (Barber 1969; Sarbin & Coe
1972) have repeatedly argued is that the hypnosis con-
struct is vague, misleading, and is not a useful conceptual
tool for organizing and understanding the findings in this
research area.
Michaux makes many statements about hypnosis based
on the presupposition that this construct is relatively
unambiguous, and that objective, specifiable criteria for
its assessment are available and agreed upon. For exam-
ple, Michaux speaks about the proximity of hypnosis to
other phenomena such as imagination; he contends that
hypnosis can have specific mental characteristics and that
"the relationship between hypnosis and suggestibility is
weak." Unfortunately, Michaux nowhere tells us how
hypnosis is supposed to differ from imagination, what the
specific mental characteristics of hypnosis are, or what
validated criteria of hypnosis he is referring to that are
only weakly related to suggestibility. Contentions like
those proffered by Michaux have proven extremely diffi-
cult to evaluate empirically precisely because state theo-
rists - Michaux included - have been unable to agree
upon specifiable criteria for inferring the presence or
absence of a hypnotic state.
Orne (e.g., 1959b) attempted to use "trance logic"
responding as a criterion of hypnosis that could be as-
sessed independently of responsiveness to test sug-
gestions. As discussed at length in the target article,
however, the research conducted on this topic has
yielded data that are more consistent with a sociocog-
nitive view than with a special-process view of hypnotic
responding.
A number of "state" theorists (Conn & Conn 1967;
Hilgard & Tart 1966) have argued that subjects' reports of
having been hypnotized (depth ratings) should be used as
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an independent criterion of the hypnotic state. Here
again, the empirical data concerning hypnotic depth
reports can be accounted for more parsimoniously by
sociocognitive interpretations that emphasize the role of
contextual factors in guiding subjects' attributions, than
by special-process theories (Radtke & Spanos 1981). For
example, highly hypnotizable subjects who report large
reductions in pain following analgesia suggestions tend to
rate themselves either as deeply hypnotized or as not at
all hypnotized depending upon the expectations trans-
mitted to them in the pain-testing situation (Spanos et al.
1988). Because Hilgard (1977b) accepts depth reports as
valid indexes of hypnosis, these findings are inconsistent
with his contention that high hypnotizables respond max-
imally to analgesia suggestions only by first "drifting into
hypnosis" (p. 50). On the other hand, these findings are
easily explained by sociocognitive explanations that em-
phasize the importance of contextual factors and expecta-
tions in determining subjects's self-descriptions as hyp-
notized or not.
One can of course argue, as Michaux appears to do in
portions of his commentary, that subjects do not and
perhaps cannot know whether they are "really hypno-
tized. " Contrary to Michaux's contentions, sociocognitive
theorists have no objection whatever to such an argu-
ment. It is, after all, special-process theorists, not so-
ciocognitive theorists who make inferences about "hyp-
notic states" on the basis of subjects' verbal reports
(Radtke & Spanos 1981). If Michaux wishes to retain the
"hypnotic state" construct while rejecting verbal reports
as in valid indexes of that state, he is of course quite
entitled to do so. However, statements such as "the
relationship between hypnosis and suggestibility is
weak," will carry little useful meaning until he provides
some objective and valid criterion of "hypnosis" that is
independent of suggestibility.
Influenceability research and hypnosis. According to
Michaux, the results of studies on influenceability and
authority cannot be accounted for in terms of social role
and require the positing of special mental states. He
singles out Milgram's (1974b) well-known research on
obedience to demonstrate the necessity of positing "spe-
cial state" explanations of response to authority.
Michaux's use of influenceability research to argue
against social role theory is particularly curious because
such research is almost invariably cited to support the
importance of contextual factors such as role legitimation,
status differences between participants in interaction,
and the adoption of the "experimental subject role" in
determining the degree of conformity exhibited by sub-
jects. This was certainly the view of Milgram (1974b), and
it is the view of the sociocognitive theorists who cite
Milgram's (1974b) work in relation to hypnosis research
(e.g., Sarbin & Coe 1972; Wagstaff 1981). Michaux,
however, appears to have developed an unusual view of
Milgram's work as well as an unusual view of sociocog-
nitive explanations.
When speaking of an "agentic state" or "agentic shift,"
Milgram (1974b) was simply referring to a shift in attitude
that people develop when they enter an authority system.
He defined agentic state as "the condition the person is in
when he sees himself as an agent for carrying out another
person's wishes" (Milgram 1974b, p. 133). According to
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Michaux, Milgram introduced the notion of agentic state
even though his subjects were unaware of undergoing any
mental changes. On the contrary, the above quoted
definition makes it quite clear that Milgram explicitly
grounded the notion of agentic state in the subjects' self-
perceptions and self-attributions. Unlike the hypo-
thetical processes posited by special-state theorists, the
notion of agentic state carries no implication that the
obedient person's behavior is no longer goal-directed, or
that purposeful behavior has been transformed into auto-
matic responding, or that obedient behavior is a function
of unusual cognitive structures or processes such as am-
nesic barriers, trance logic, hidden selves, and dissoci-
ations.
Milgram's (1974b) experiments were aimed at identify-
ing the contextual variables that led subjects to define
themselves and to act in accordance with the view that
they were agents for carrying out another's wishes. Simi-
larly, sociocognitive theorists' work on hypnotic subjects'
reports of involuntariness is based on the contention that
the subjects' behavior remains goal-directed, but that
they come to interpret their goal-directed behavior as
occurring involuntarily (Gorassini 1987b; Lynn et al., in
press; Spanos 1986). One of the important concerns in
this research has been to delineate the contextual vari-
ables that lead subjects to shift from viewing themselves
as goal-directed agents to viewing themselves as passive
observers of their own automatically occurring responses.
In short, the constructs used by Milgram (1974b) to
explain obedience are in no way inconsistent either with
social role theory or with the constructs used by sociocog-
nitive theorists to account for hypnotic behavior. On the
contrary, both Milgram's (1974b) work on obedience and
the empirical work on hypnosis generated by the so-
ciocognitive approach show how useful it is to view
human social responding as the contextually bounded,
goal-directed behavior of active agents.
At one point, Michaux implies that suggestions given to
hypnotic subjects (those undergoing a hypnotic induction
procedure) produce more frequent and/or more intense
experiences of responding involuntarily than do the same
suggestions given to waking subjects (those not given a
prior hypnotic induction). A number of studies have
explicitly addressed this issue; all results contradict
Michaux's hypothesis (cf. Spanos 1986 for a review),
indicating that the wording of the test suggestions is a
much more potent determinant of experienced involun-
tariness than is the presence or absence of a hypnotic
induction procedure. Both hypnotic and nonhypnotic
subjects who were administered passively worded com-
munications (e.g., "your arm is rising") were likely to rate
their subsequent response as feeling involuntary, where-
as those who received actively worded communications
(e.g., "please raise your arm") were likely to rate their
responses as voluntary (Spanos & Gorassini 1984). These
findings are consistent with the emphasis placed by
sociocognitive theory on the contextual determinants of
subjects' self-attributions. They are less consistent with
the notion that hypnotic procedures facilitate "dissocia-
tions" that underlie involuntary responding.
Misconceptions of sociocognitive theory. According to
Michaux, sociocognitive accounts of hypnotic responding
tend to associate wakeful mental functioning "with a
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single type of mental activity," and fail to take into
account such activities as changes in reality testing and
attention. Sociocognitive theories are also supposed to be
based on the "unsubstantiated assertion that social be-
havior can be satisfactorily explained without reference to
possible changes in mental functioning." These theories
also supposedly imply that "the subject cannot be opaque
to himself," and that the terms "role playing" and "role
enactment" refer "to an interpretation in terms of lying
and simulation."
Not only are these claims about the sociocognitive
perspective wrong, but they are wrong about issues that
were specifically addressed in the target article and in my
response to the original commentators as well as in the
first-round commentary by Wagstaff (1986) and in the
second round of commentary by Gorassini (1987a). For
example, the target article reviewed a number of studies
that described how implicit and explicit demands can lead
subjects to engage in imaginal and other cognitive strat-
egies for pain reduction. Also reviewed were a series of
studies examining the relationship between different
types of amnesia tasks, shifts in attention, and disor-
ganized recall. The section in the target article on "trance
logic" responding dealt in detail with the differences in
cognitive functioning that characterize highly suggestible
hypnotic subjects and subjects instructed to fake hypno-
sis. These differences in cognitive functioning were in
turn related to differences in the interpretations of the
hypnotic test situation by hypnotic subjects and simu-
lators.
Obviously, sociocognitive approaches do not deny the
existence of cognitive activity or contextually induced
changes in cognitive functioning. On the contrary, the
sociocognitive research has focused extensively on the
interrelations of context, cognitive change, and behavior
in hypnotic settings; this focus was clearly reflected in the
target article.
The idea that subjects can be opaque to themselves
usually refers to the notion that subjects frequently make
incorrect inferences about the causes of their own behav-
ior and frequently base self-attributions on these incor-
rect inferences. Contrary to Michaux's thinking, these
notions are not incompatible with the sociocognitive
view. In fact, I used the idea of misattribution in account-
ing for the reports of involuntary responding from hyp-
notic subjects (e.g., Spanos 1986); Gorassini (1987a) out-
lined a sociocognitive account of such misattributions in
his second-round BBS commentary. Sarbin (e.g., 1984)
has written extensively on this topic; he explicitly de-
scribed hypnotic subjects as self-deceived and developed
a sociocognitive account for such self-deception.
Again in contradiction to Michaux's view, the notion of
changes in reality testing has also been addressed at some
length in sociocognitive accounts of hypnotic responding.
For example, a central theoretical concern in my own
work (e.g., Spanos & Radtke 1981) and also in the work of
Sarbin and Coe (e.g., 1972) has been to account for how
subjects (both hypnotic and nonhypnotic) come to assign
credibility or "reality status" to their imaginings.
Equating role playing or role enactment with lying or
faking was explicitly rejected by Sarbin (1950) when he
first applied role theory to hypnotic responding and has
been repeatedly rejected by him ever since (e.g., Sarbin
& Coe 1972). I have also repeatedly rejected this in my
own work (e.g., Spanos 1986) and did so at some length in
my response to the original commentaries. Despite all of
this, Michaux states that notions like role enactment
imply lying and simulation. This, and the other inac-
curacies specified above, suggest that Michaux has se-
riously misinterpreted the social-psychological position
that he attempts to criticize.
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Commentary on M. B. Berkinblit, A. G. Feldman, and O. I. Fukson (1986) Adaptability of innate motor
patterns and motor control mechanisms. BBS 9: 585-638.
Abstract of the original article: The following factors underlying behavioral plasticity are discussed: (1) reflex adaptability and its role
in the voluntary control of movement, (2) degrees of freedom and motor equivalence, and (3) the problem of the discrete
organization of motor behavior. Our discussion concerns a variety of innate motor patterns, with emphasis on the wiping reflex in
the frog.
It is proposed that central regulation of stretch reflex thresholds governs voluntary control over muscle force and length. This
suggestion is an integral part of the equilibrium-point hypothesis, two versions of which are compared.
Kinematic analysis of the wiping reflex in the spinal frog has shown that each stimulated skin site is associated with a group of
different but equally effective trajectories directed to the target site. Such phenomena reflect the principle of motor equivalence -
the capacity of the neuronal structures responsible for movement to select one or another of a set of possible trajectories leading to
the goal. Redundancy of degrees of freedom at the neuronal level as well as at the mechanical level of the body's joints makes motor
equivalence possible. This sort of equivalence accommodates the overall flexibility of motor behavior.
An integrated behavioral act or a single movement consists of dynamic components. We distinguish six components for the
wiping reflex, each associated with a certain functional goal, specific body positions, and motor-equivalent movement patterns.
The nervous system can combine the available components in various ways in forming integrated behavioral sequences. The
significance of command neuronal organization is discussed with respect to (1) the combinatory strategy of the nervous system and
(2) the relation between continuous and discrete forms of motor control. We conclude that voluntary movements are effected by
the central nervous system with the help of the mechanisms that underlie the variability and modifiability of innate motor patterns.
Motor control as adaptational biology:
Relevance to education and rehabilitation
Gary Goldberg and Nathaniel H. Mayer
Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Temple University
School of Medicine and Moss Rehabilitation Hospital, Philadelphia, Pa.
19141
Berkinblit et al.'s (1986) target article can be divided into two
main topics: the concept of motor constancy and adaptation as it
relates to the observation of modifiable protective reflexes in the
spinal frog, and the problem of modeling the stretch reflex in
man. We will restrict our comments to the former.
Berkinblit et al. make a powerful and provocative statement
in their abstract: "Redundancy of degrees of freedom at the
neuronal level as well as at the mechanical level of the body's
joints makes motor equivalence possible." Unfortunately, this
statement does not appear to be either adequately supported by
direct evidence or explicitly elaborated. It is not clear how one
should interpret "degrees of freedom at the neuronal level" and
how these dimensions are to be distinguished from the bio-
mechanical degrees of freedom of the body mechanism. Never-
theless, this is an intriguing explanation for the principle of
motor equivalence and motor constancy as manifest in the goal-
directed adaptive actions that have been grouped together and
labeled the "wiping reflex" of the spinal frog. The word "reflex,"
however, carries some unfortunate connotations that are anti-
thetical to the concept of motor constancy or functional specifici-
ty. A reflex has often been defined as stereotyped or ma-
chinelike reactions elicited by specific stimuli (e.g., Carew
1985), a notion that derives from a simplistic input-output
mechanistic analogy. The behaviors that Berkinblit et al. de-
scribe in the spinal frog do not fit with this idea and suggest that
we must either redefine what we mean by the "reflex" concept,
or create new terminology. The wiping reflex of the spinal frog is
not simply a stereotyped response to a specific input, just as the
vestibulo-ocular "reflex" is not simply a fixed stereotyped move-
ment of the eyes linked inflexibly to movement of the head.
These behaviors can be viewed as purposive, adaptive actions
with readily defined goals that have biologic significance. The
wiping reflex is a specific self-contained action that is clearly
goal-oriented and adaptive. That it offered a solution to the
"motor problem" of preserving the integrity of the integument
by physically displacing a noxious contact probably led to its
evolutionary selection and reinforcement. Evolution selects for
functional specificity by virtue of the fact that survival is out-
come dependent. Furthermore, the wiping reflex is not simply a
single movement in a particular context but an ensemble of
action forms from which a particular action is selected as a result
of the conjunction of the eliciting condition (e.g., applying a
noxious stimulus to a particular point on the skin) and the menu
of available actions and actuators (behavioral forms), which
appears to have a hierarchical structure (e.g., amputation of the
hind limb ipsilateral to the site of stimulus application reveals
the "hidden" ability to use the contralateral hind limb to achieve
the same outcome).
What holds the ensemble together is the common adaptive
function served. There is no normative element in the ensemble
of potential actions; rather, the key characteristic is the adaptive
function subserved by the behavior. The forms in the ensemble
vary because the same adaptive function must be performed
under a myriad of potentially constraining circumstances stem-
ming from factors intrinsic to the organism as well as from
variation in the environment. Moreover, this variety and thus
the flexibility with which an action can be performed are made
possible by the redundant biomechanical degrees of freedom
available to perform the act and to attain the goal.
These biomechanical degrees of freedom can be viewed as
defining a multidimensional body position space (or, equiv-
alently, joint angle), B, into which all possible biomechanical
trajectories (time-dependent changes in body configuration), T,
can be mapped. In preparation for the performance of each act, a
particular trajectory is isolated and selected from this space
through an emergent neural process. During the selection
process, the eliciting condition and the context of performance
progressively constrain the boundaries of B from which a satis-
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